Editor's note: The comment below is a brief critique of an article by Professor Jerry Beatty of Simpson College which recently appeared in this Review. Professor Beatty's rebuttal follows immediately.
STATE COURT EVASION OF UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT MANDATES: A RECONSIDERATION OF THE EVIDENCE

INTRODUCTION
In a recent issue this journal published an article by Professor Jerry Beatty' in which the author "examine[d] the litigation in state courts subsequent to a remand by the Supreme Court ..
."I As Beatty notes, it has been nearly 20 years since such a study has appeared and his findings are quite intriguing. He reports eight cases of true evasion 3 and ten instances of "quasi-evasion. ' This is a significant increase over the number of such occurrences in previous decades 5 and should be very troubling to those concerned with the legitimacy of the Supreme Court.
Professor Beatty has undoubtedly produced a timely and provocative article. However, he claims much more for it. By examining the "litigation in state cases following Supreme Court remands" he purports "to determine the magnitude of state court evasion of Court mandates. ' This he cannot do. Examining the percentage of state court evasions of Supreme Court mandates in cases remanded to the states does exactly that and no more. Such a study is admirable but it is incorrect to claim that by this method one has uncovered "the extent to which state courts use their discretion in a manner inconsistent with the Court's mandates." 7 This definition of evasion is unrealistically re-stricted. It uncovers only the smallest fraction of evasions' and leads to a grossly distorted picture as to the true degree of state court evasions.' The scope of the problem can only be appreciated by an examination of the various means by which state courts avoid the effect of Supreme Court mandates.
METHODS OF EVASION
No study has yet been published which investigates the dimensions of the problem systematically and thoroughly. 
Ignoring the Mandate
Ignoring a Supreme Court decision is perhaps the easiest way to mitigate its effects. In a study of southern state supreme court decisions in the area of civil rights, Kenneth Vines notes that "[in about half of the cases the decisions cited no precedents from federal courts bearing on civil rights."" Similarly, in examining the impact of the Supreme Court ruling in Zorach v. Clauson 1 2 (which validated early release from public school for religious instruction), Frank Sorauf reports "several instances where the Zorach decision has, surprisingly, been ignored when directly relevant .
Stephen Wasby has explored the influence on the Oregon state 8. Under Beatty's definition it is not considered evasive if state courts not directly involved in the litigation disregard the rulings of the Supreme Court. For example, if a case on appeal to the United States Supreme Court from California is reversed and remanded to that state for final disposition, and California and 20 other states evade the ruling, the total number of evasions (according to Beatty's definition) is one.
9. One writer finds that "[miore significant than the state judges' treatment of cases remanded to them is their application and interpretation of doctrines announced by the Supreme Court which are supposed to bind all judges in future cases." J. PELTASON 
Narrow Construction
State courts often evade Supreme Court rulings by interpreting the decision very narrowly or by finding that the case before them is distinguishable from the relevant High Court ruling. In Betts v. Brady, 2 for example, the Court ruled that the defendants in noncapital cases were entitled to state-appointed counsel if special circumstances were present making it impossible for the defendant to represent himself adequately. However, in only 11 out of 139 state appellate cases concerning this issue were special circumstances found. 2 9 In reference to another decision, Edward Beiser reports that although "[i]t was generally understood that Baker v. Carr required lower courts to deal with apportionment cases. . . six of the nineteen state supreme courts 'ducked' apportionment questions .... ,,30
Other decisions have been emasculated in the same manner. The Court's ruling in Kent v. United StatesM' has been distinguished at least three times.
3 2 In the landmark case of Miranda v. Arizona 33 the Supreme Court held that a criminal suspect must be informed of his constitutional rights before being questioned. However, "there have been a number of instances" where the decision was held inapplicable to cases before the state courts. 34 Turning again to the Mapp decision, Manwaring finds that the courts in Michigan, New Jersey, Texas, Pennsylvania, and New York have distinguished the case away2 8 The author notes that in its objective to make federal search and seizure precedents binding on the state courts, the Court met with only partial and very spotty success. . . . Aside from the basic changeover to the exclusionary rule, no state changed its behavior . . .3
CONCLUSION
As the above survey indicates, many state courts manage to circumvent United States Supreme Court mandates. Even though no studies to date have realistically measured the extent to which state courts evade such decisions, the fragmentary evidence available indicates that the practice is rather widespread. 0 Indeed, it may well be the rule rather than the exception. It appears, therefore, that Professor Beatty's conclusion that "most state courts have an admirable record of compliance '' 4 1 is unfounded.
